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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF VENNA DARLENE BERM, Deceased. EDWARD C. BERM,

Protestant and Respondent,
Case No.
7305

vs.
ALMA GEE, personally, and as admin-istrator of the Estate of V enna Darlene Behm, Deceased,

Appeltant.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal is to determine to whom and· in what
amounts distribution should be made of a sum recov·ered
for the death of Venna Darlene Behm. ·Verma Darlene
Behm died in childbirth at Salt Lake City, Utah, February 18, 1947, leaving surviving as her only heirs her husband, Edward C. Behm,. the protestant and respondent
here, and two baby daughters horn at their mother's
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death. The deceased was the daughter of the appellant,
Alma Gee. ( Tr. ·3, 4, 104). Following the death of Mrs.
Behm and upon the petition of her husband and father,
her father on April2:9, 1947, was appointed administrator
for the purpose of bringing an action for negligence for
the benefit of her heirs, her husband and two baby
daughters, against a local physician. (Tr. 3, 4, 8). On
the same day and upon the petition of her husband and
father the father was also appointed guardian of the estates. of the two minor daughters, File No. 2907·5, in the
District Court of Salt Lake County, attached as an exhibit in this case. Both petitions were dated and sworn
to Ap·ril 11, 1947. In the petitions for appointment of
administrator and guardian it was recited that the only
estate of the decedent was a claim and action for negligence against the doctor for her death, and that the only
estates of the minors consisted of such a claim, and that
it was the purpos:e of the administrator and guardian
to bring an action or make a settlement on account of said
death.
Thereafter the administrator filed a complaint July
28, 1947, against th·e doctor, in the District Court of
Salt Lake County for the death of said ·decedent, reciting that her only heirs were her husband, Edward c.
Be·hm, and two baby daughters, Venna Julene Behm and
Cheryl Darlene Behm, and tha;t as the result of the negligence of the defendant the aforesaid heirs had been
damaged and asked for judgment by reason thereof,
File No. 80962 in the District Court of Salt Lake County
attached as an exhibit herein. As a result of this latter
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action a settlen1ent 'Yith the defendant therein was arrived at, and on January 7, 1948, the District Court of
Salt Lake County authorized the administrator to make
a settlement in the sum of $15,000.00 and to pay therefrom to his attorney, Shirley P. J·ones, th·e sum of $3,750.00, ''attorney's fee solely for services rendered in
making and securing said settlement," (Tr. 14). At the
same time the fath·er as guardian was also authorized
to execute a release and satisfaction in full for any
claims of said minors by reason of the death of the
mother of said minors, (No. 29075).
On April 28, 1947, the day before the ap·pointment
of the guardian and administrator as aforesaid, the husband, protestant and respondent here, executed a document as follows, ("Tr. 19, 111, 112, Exhibit 6) :
"IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT L.AKE
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate
of
\TENNA DARLENE BERM,
Deceased.

)
)
) ASSIGNMENT
)

Edward C. Behm, the husband of the above
entitled deceased, for a valuable consideration and
for the further consideration that .Alma Gee, the
father of S'aid deceased, has instituted and will
·continue to carry on further proceedings for the
recovery for said estate of anything ·due it for
the death of said deceased, and particularly anything due the minor .children of the undersigned,
·and the said deceased ·does hereby assign, transSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
fer andLibraryset
over unto th·e said Alma Gee all his
Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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right, title, claim and interest in and to the said
,estate, the proceeds thereof, and particularly the
proceeds of any recovery made or recovered from
Von G. Holbrook, or any recovery made or recovered for the death of said deceased. It is expressly understood that the said minor children shall
receive th,eir full share of said estate free and
clear of this assignment to be administrated under
the guardianship proceedings heretofore instituted on th·eir behalf by the said Alma Gee with
the consent of the undersigned.
D·ated at Salt L:ake City, Utah, this 28th day
of April, 1947.
(Signed)

EDWARD C. BERM,
Edward C. Behm.

Witness: (Signed) AMY C. GEE
(Signed) JULENE GEE''
A draft for $15,000.00 was given in payment of the
settlement, and this draft did not clear from collection
until J anuaitr 28, 1948, ( Tr. 184). A couple of weeks
after that and before any distribution could he made
of the remainder of the settlement Mr. Behm, the husband, and his attorney, Mr. Langlois, came to the, office
of th·e administrator's a:ttorney. This was the first time
th·ere had been any question of any controversy between
the husband and the father concerning this matter. No
question was ever raised by the husband until after the
seittlement had been made.
This controversy over the distribution of the money
continued back and forth for a couple of weeks, (Tr. 184).
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No satisfactory conclusion was arrived at, and on April
23, 1948, the husband petitioned the District Court for
an order to sho"" cause "~hy the $11,250.00 remaining
from the settlement should not be distributed to himself
and his t'vo minor daughters, (Tr. 15, 17). A citation was
issued by the court for the administrator to show cause
why he should not be required to disburse the $11,250.00
to the heirs of the deceased and to show cause why the·
court should not declare the foregoing ''Assignment''
of .A.pril 28 to be null and void and of no effect. The administrator filed objections to the citation which were
taken under advisement and overruled, (Tr. 28). The
administrator then petitioned the court for distribution
to himself by virtue of the said ''Assignment'' and to
the said minors, or in the alternative that he be allowed
a quantum men.:t for his services in the ·event. the other
distribution should be denied, (Tr. 31). To this petition
the husband, protestant here, filed objections alleging
that he had paid the last illness and funeral expeng.es of
his deceased wife in the sum of $1,652.00, and that- he had
obligated himself to pay for th·e support and maintenance of ~he minor children; that the ''·-Assignment'' from
himself to his father-in-law, the administrator, was void,
and asking the court to take into consideration his ·payment of these expenses, and ''that this court enter its
order distributing said $11,250.00, together with interest
to your protestant as the surviving husband of V enna
Darlene Behm, deceased, and to Venna Julene Behm and
Cheryl Darlene Behm, taking into consideration the physical condition and mental condition of said children,
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and taking into consideration the expenditures heretofore
rnade and obligations incurred by your peitioner. '' (Tr.
41).
To this objection of the huhsand, the administrator
filed an answer, (Tr. 45), and a supplemental answer
and reply setting forth that he, the father, had become
administrator and guardian at the request of the protestant and entered u.pon his duties and performed all
of the same as required by the ''Assignment'', and had
fully complied with all the things to be done by him all
in relian0e upon the acts and conduct of the p-rotestant,
and that the protestant is estopped to raise any question as to the said ''Assignment'', except the issue of
fraud and misrepre~sentation, (Tr. 52, 53).
The matter came on for hearing. Th-e: findings, conclusions and judgm·ent of the court cover ten pages in
the transcript and are too long to be set forth haec verba
herein. The matters recited therein pertaining to the record already appear in the· files and need no re·petition.
The court round that the husband was grief-stricken all
. during February, March and April of 1947, and that he
had full confidenee, and trust in the father and ''told him
to go ahead with arrangements for suit''; that during
said period there wer-e discussions .betw·een the husband
and father ·concerning a suit against the doctor, and that
the father consulted various lawyers and ''proposed to
the protestant that they go into a partnership· for the
purpose of commencing suit against the doctor", (Tr.
56) ; that the husband joined in the petition for appointment of guardian and administrator and read the same
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in the office of Shirley P. Jones, the attorney for the
administrator, and that: on Ap,ril 28, 1947, he, the husband, at the home of the father signed the ''Assignnlent ", (Exhibit 6) ; that '~there was no consideration
given Edward C. Behn1 by said Alma Gee for said
assigmnent''; that Behm did not fully understand the
import of the contents of the ''Assignment'', nor had
he been fully and completely instructed as to his rights,
''nor did Alma Gee at said time say anything concerning the contents of said assignment to the protestant,
nor attempt to explain said contents", ( Tr. 57). The
findings further find that the father paid out certain
expenses in connection with the administrator and guardianship matters and the suit against the doctor; that
after the $11,250.00 was paid to the father in the settlement he deposited the same to his account as administrator and thereafter withdrew the money, and later deposited it, then again on M-ay 13, 1948, withdrew it, and
without authority or order of the court ''appropriated
to his own use $750.00 of said money, and that upon orde·r
of this court duly made during the trial of this cause,
Alma Gee brought into court the sum of $10,500.00, which
the court impounde,d and which is now in the custody of
the Clerk of S:alt Lake County.'' The findings further
relate that the protestant was not informed of the progress of the case nor the settlement, and that he discovered that the settlement had been made in Dece·mher
of 1947 or January, 1948 (Tr. 58, 59). The court found
that Sponsored
"Alma
Gee was not a credible witness on the trial
by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of this case, and finds that said Alma Gee fraudulently
and wilfully attempted to conceal from the court the
amount of money he had in his possession at the time
of said hearing, and that the evidence given by the said
Alma Gee in this hearing is not to be relied upon, * * * ",
(Tr. 59). The Cou-rt· further found. that Edward C.
Behm is emp~oyed and earns $25.00 a week as an ap. prentice architect, an additional $100.00 a month as proceeds from a loan and earns additional money as a
musician ; ''that he has remarried, and that he does not
now and never did need or desire any of the 1noney recovered ·on account of the death of his wife, and that,
therefore, there is nothing to be assigned to Alma Gee
by him under the terms and conditions of Exhibit 1,
(Note: should be Exhibit 6), even were it valid and binding." (Tr. 60). ·The father attempted to have a judicial
record made of the, fact that his ·children are physically
and mentally arrested in their developm·ent which the
court refused to find, (Tr. 60). 'The court found that

$500.00 is a reasonable sum to be paid to C. Vernon
Langlois and Ray S. McCarty for their services herein,
(Tr. 60), and from such findings concluded that the
cause of action for the death of Venna Darlene Behm
vested immediately upon her death in her heirs, ''and
that the recovery belonged to the heirs''; that the cause
of action and the recovery for wrongful death was not
assignable, and therefore Exhibit 1, (should be Exhibit
6), ''the purported assignment of Edward C. Behm to
Alma Gee, was void and of no effect'' ; that there was no
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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consideration for the said d ..A.ssignn1ent ", '~and said assignnlent "~as chan1perty and therefore void and of no
effect "?ha tsoever ~ ', and '~that because of the fact that
Ed\Ya.rd C. Behm does· not require or need any of the
recovery, and because of the condition of arrested development, pllriii~ulll~? t-uul HU~Rt~y, (stricken by the
court) and the needs of the minor children, to-wit, Venna
Julene Behm and Cheryl Darlene Behn1, the said Edward
C. Behm is not entitled to any ordeT awarding him any
part of said recovery." (Tr. 61). The court then found
that the father administrator was not entitled to any
share by reason of the said" Assignment", Exhibit 6, but
that on account of his services and money exp·ended he
'vas entitled to the $750.00, (which the court had s.aid he
had obtained fraudulently ·and unlawfully), (Tr. 59, 60),
and that he should ret~ the $750.00 unla~ully retained
by him in full payment of his services; that the protestant's attorneys were entitled to $500.00 for their services,
and that the balance .of the $10,000.00 should b~ turned
over to the guardian of the minors, $5,000.00 for each
minor, "when said guardian has posted good and sufficient bond for the protection of said minors, or to some
reputable trust compa~y, if a trust company is substituted for the present guardian." (Tr. 62). The judgment
followed the conclusions of law, (Tr. 63, 64). O·bjections
were made to the proposed findings of fact ·at pages 66 to
79 of the transcript. The findings of fact, conclusions of
law and judgment were signed November 18, 1948 (Tr.
64), and immediately on the same day an appeal therefrom was taken 'to this court, (Tr. 6-5).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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THE GUARDIAN·SHIP MATTER
The ink was hardly dry on the findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment until the husband, the
protestant here, secured an order to show cause- dated
November 19, 1948, why the father should not be removed
as guardian and the First Security Trust Company appointed in his stead. This file is an exhibit here, the
guardianship matter is in this court on appeal and will
be separately presented.

THE TESTIMONY
At the hearing Shirley P. Jones of Salt Lake City
and Lewis Larson of Manti app~eared as attorneys for
the father administrator and Ray S. McCarty and C.
Vernon Langlois of Salt Lake City appeared for the protestant husband, (Tr. 99). Because he· expected to be a
witness . for the administrator, Mr. Jones during the
hearing attempted to withdraw as attorney in the matter.
The trial court said that would not he necessary, but
that Mr. Jones couldn't argue the evidence. to the~ court.
Thereupon Mr. McC-arty stated that he was willing to
have Mr. Jones argue the matte·r and that they would
waive. any objection they might otherwise have under
the cannon of ethics. ( Tr. 144, 145). Mr. Jones, therefore,
is actively participating in this appeal.
In support of his objections to the petition for
distribution the p~rotestant testified that he· was very
upset at the time of the death of his wife, and that at the
hospital her father and mother stated that they were
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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going to sue the doctor and even threatened the doctor's
life; that the funeral 'Yas about ·one '""eek later, ( Tr. 105) ;
that he paid the funeral expenses and the doctor bill,
for a monument for his wife and for services at the h·ospital for the "~ife and children totaling $1,652.10, including .$100.00 to the doctor, (Tr. 106, 107 and Exhibits 1,
2, 3, -1, 5). He testified that some time after the funeral
of his wife he visited his wife's father, and that he told
him at that time that if he, the father, wasn't going to
sue, he, Behm, the husband, would "like to take it over".

"Q. What did Mr. Gee tell you~
A. He said there would be no sens,e of two of us
fighting the case, and I agreed with him to let
him take it over." (T.108).
That at that time he had no ill feelings towards Mr.
Gee, the father, and that he had faith and confidence in
him; that the next he heard about it was when he went

up to Mr. Jones' office to sign some papers in regards
to the guardianship matter to proceed with the case,
and that it is his signature that appears on both the
petition for appointment of Alma Gee as guardian and
as administrator, (Tr. 109); that these papers were
signed on the 11th of April, 1947, and that he called up
Mr. Langlois and asked him if it was all right, and that
nothing at that time was said about the "Assignment",
(Tr. 110); Mr. Jones explained to him his guardianship
rights, (Tr. 112), that a few days later at the Gee's (the
deceased's father and mother) home he signed another
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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paper, (Tr. 110), which is the original "Assignment",
Exhibit 6, (Tr. 111).
''A.

They called me up and said that they had
forgotten one paper at the office that needed
to be signed and if I would come down and
sign it, and I went down to the house and
read it over, and I read wh·ere it said that the
children would get their share of it, ·am.d I was
~assigning my share over I figured to them at
the time. (Italics added.)

Q. Did you at any time or at all intend to assign
any of ·your share to Mr. Gee?
A.

I at no time knew that I had a share coming."
(T. 112).

That thereafter when he would ask how things were
working out on the case the Gees would tell him it's
working that's all, and it wasn't until the doctor's nurse
told them of the settlement for $15,000.00 that he lmew
about .it; that was when the doctor~s nurse kept calling
him to pay an extra $100.00 to the dQGtor, (Tr. 114).
When this was the witness finally decided. was Aprill,
1948, (Tr. 118). The court found it was December, 1947,
or January, 1948. (Tr. 59). When he found out about
the settlement, he went to see Mr. Jones who told him
that it was none of his business, that he· had nothing more
to do with the cas.e. Mr. Jones never told him to put in
a claim for the fune·ral, hos·pital or doctor's bills or that
he had a claim for them, (Tr. 116); that he never received any notice of the petition for p·ermission to settle
the ·case against the doctor, (Tr. 118), nor did he know
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that the 1natter can1e up in court for settlement, (Tr.
119) . .~..t\t the time he signed the ''Assignment" Mr. Gee
didn't giYe hin1 anything nor a copy of it, although Mr.
Gee had three copies, (Tr. 119).
On cross examination he stated that he was thirty
years old; that h-e reads and writes the English language
kno". .s several attorneys in Salt Lake City, and that he
would have pressed a claim against the doctor if his
father-in-lR\Y didn't want to.

"Q. Yes, but why was it that you didn't want
toA. Because I was still ups·et.

Q. -if he
A.

would~

This is only a month and a half after I lost
my wife, and I was very upset, and I am
still upset about it.'' (Tr. 120, 121).

He signed Exhibit 6, he read it and he didn't talk to anyone about it. (Tr. 122). He didn't talk to Mr. J·ones in
his office about the "Assignlp.ent", (Tr. 123). He went
up to Mr. Jones' office to sign the pap.ers. If Mr. Gee
was going to fight the case, he wasn't going to, (Tr. 125).

''Q. Well, whatever interest you had in the claim
you assigned to Mr. Gee if he would do that,
didn't you~
A.

It looks that.way.

Q. Yes ; and you read this
A.

Yes sir.

assignment~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
Q.

And you had a conversation about it with
these p·eople ~

A.

Y-es sir.

Q.

But you can't remember much about what
was said?

A.

They at the house told me that they needed
this one more paper signed that they had
forgotten at the office and had to bring it
down to the house for me to sign it." ( Tr. 126,
127).

At Mr. Gee's place on the 28th there were present Mr.
and Mrs.. Gee and their daughter, Julene, who was about
18 years of age.
'' Q.

Well, what was said in this conversation then
down at Mr. Gee's place, if you remember?

'A. ·That they were trying to get suit against the
doctor and they ne·eded this paper to finish
it up so they could start right on the case.
Q. I see.

A. That they couldn't do a thing without this
paper being signed.
Q.

So then it was clear to you that they hadn't
commenced any action, wasn't it1

A. Yes sir.'' (Tr. 127, 128).
On redirect examination he stated that he called Mr.
Langlois on the 11th of Ap-ril and read him the headlines, and Mr. Langlois said, '' That's all right. Sign it.''
There was no "Assignment" handed to him that day.
He doesn't know whether Mr. Jones was there when he
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"ras talking to ~{r. Langlois, but it was in Mr. Jones'
office, (Tr. 129).
The children were kept in the hospital a month and
a half after their birth, and they have been with his
mother ever since, (Tr. 130). Exhibit 11 was introduced
for the purpose of showing the physical condition of the
children. Exhibit 11 reads:
November 2, 1948
J ulene Behm, 20 months of age, is less well
developed than her twin Darlene Behm; therefore
she will need more home care as well as medical
care.

Signed,
Spencer Snow, M.D. (Tr. 170).
As to the condition of the children, the witness said one
of them was retarded.

''Q.

What~

A.

Retarded.

Q.

Both~

A.

Only the one is wors·e, yes.'' ( Tr. 171).

That his salary is $25.00 a week as an architectural
draftsman; that he is going to school under the G. I. Bill;
that he is married at the present time, was remarried
August 27, 1948; that his mother had the children until
about a week ago; that he gets about $100.00 a month in
addition
from a loan he has out; that he gets about $25.00
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a week playing for a dance orchestra, (Tr. 171, 173);
that he collected $11,000.00 or $12,000.00 from the railroad company in February, 1947; that he is ,perfectly
able to support his children, and that he has the earning
capacity to do so, (Tr. 173, 174).
The protestant's mother, Mrs. Elvina Behm, testified that she had had the babies with her at her home
since they were six weeks old until last Tuesday. The
case was heard Wednesday, N ovemher 3, so last Tuesday would he the day before the hearing. She stated that
Darlene is not like an average baby, not like my children.
;She is just beginning to walk, and she is nearly 21 months
old, and she can't feed herself, and ·can't talk. The other
one can't sit up alone and can't stand and has no control
over her body. She is less developed than the other. (Tr.
176).
The protestant called the appellant administrator,
Mr. Gee, as his witness and develop~ed what the record
already shows, that he had filed $100.00 bonds as required
by the court; that he received $11,250.00 from Mr. Jones;
that the money was at his house in cur~ency; that Mr.
Jones deposited the draft given in settlement of the
ease in the First National Bank and issued the witness
a check which he, the witness, had deposited in the Continental National Bank; that he later withdrew it from
the Continental National Bank upon the advice of his
attorney, Mr. Lewis Larson, who told him it wasn't safe
in the hank because it might he garnisheed by the protestant, his son-in-law, who had already told him that he,
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the witness, 'vas going to have trouble, (Tr. 131, 137).
After he took the money from the bank, he put it back
again and then drew it out again. He paid $200.00 to
~Ir. Larson who had told him that he, Mr. Larson,
thought it best to take it out of the bank. The witness
stated that he didn't know how much he had spent, but
he could tell at the noon recess. Upon questioning by
the court he stated that he didn't think he could bring
in $11,250.00 at 2 :00. Thereupon the court re~essed until
2 :00 with directions to the witness to bring the money
into court at 2:00, (Tr. 137, 140). At 2:00 the witness
produced $7,500.00 which he said was for the babies
which was deposited with the Clerk, (Tr. 143). Later in
his testimony he stated that in addition. to the $200.00
he had given ~Ir. Larson he had spent $550.00, and he
thereupon produced an additional $3,000.00 which was
deposited_ with the Clerk, (Tr. 153). The witness 'vas
questioned about the dates of dep-osit and withdrawal.
rhe bank's statement of his account was received iJJ
evidence, . Exhibits 8 .and 10, and they show deposits
totaling $11,250.00 January 28, 1948, the_ day he received
the $11,250.00 from Mr. Jones shown by Exhibit 9; that
on May 7, 1948, all of the money was drawn out except
$1.00, redeposited May -13, 1948, and drawn out finally
in the full amount of $11,250.00 on June 30, 1948. Part
of the money was on deposit as federal insured savings,
hut the bank will only take $5,000.00, that way so the rest
'vas in a gene~al account in his name as administrator,
(Tr. 147). It was after the citation to appear April 28,
1948,Sponsored
thatby thehe
withdrew the money the last time June 30,
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1948, on the advice of Mr. Larson; (Tr. 148) that he drew
it out:
''Because I didn't want this man to get hold
of that money and plunge it for every wildcat
there was in this town. When my daughter died,
she didn't have a place to live in. She had to come
to my I)lace. !She didn't have a house to live in
with any heat. She was pregnant with these two
children, with them twins. 'She had to come to my
hous;e and get warm and live there and stay there,
and she says, 'I haven't had anything to eat for
three days but bread and gravy.' I said, 'You
come in and eat all you want.' ''
"MR. McCARTY: I ask thatA.

That's the reason I took that money out,
and he got $11,500.00 in cash from the railroad in a week after my daughter died, and
then he comes and squandered it for ·every
fool thing there was around here; bought
automobiles; bought picture show machines;
went to Mexico on a trip; went to Yellowstone
Park. That is the reason I am holding· onto
this money, because I hope them babies-"
(Tr. 149, 150).

That when his daughter went to the hospital they didn't
have any money to pay the doctor bill. He advised her
that he, the witness, would pay $100.00 of the doctor bill.
They didn't have any coal in the house, and ''that's the
reason I am holding on to it, and that's the reason I drew
it out of the bank.'' ( Tr. 154). Answering questions from
Mr. McCarty suggesting the answers he agreed that
he knew that if the protestant., Behm, knew there was
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a big sUin of n1oney a,. ailable he 'votud want it, and that
he would be reaching his hands out for it. He kne'v
that from the beginning, and that he would be in there
with both hands trying to get it. He asked Behm about
the hospital bills, and Behm told him it 'vas $1600.00;
whereas, it \Yas only $900.00 or $1,000.00. The witness
has the figures from the hospital and the mortuary, and,
w·hereas, Behm says his bills were $1600.00 they were
less than $1,000.00.
On his o'vn behalf the administrator, Mr. Gee, testified that when his daughter died he told the doctor he
was going to sue for damages, and when he related this
down at ~fr. Behm's home, "they jumped all over me."
Down at Mr. Behm's home he was told, "you can't get
anything out of a doctor'', and that he was a fool to
even try it. 1\tfr. Behm, the husband, and his mother and
others were there. It was right after the funeral. Mr.
Behm came up to his p~ace several times and said, ''You
can't get anything out of that doctor; no use for you to
waste your time and money on it.'' This was right after
his daughter died some time in March, 1947, (Tr. 200,
201). He came to his place every two or three days.
Some time in March of 1947 Behm ·came to see G·ee and
asked Gee if he were going to sue that doctor. Gee
said that he thought he would and Behm tried to change
his mind on it. Behm said, ''They have got a fence around
them with the law, and you can't get in." (Tr. 203).
With reference to the ''Assignment'' the witness
testified
over
the
told
Behm
he had
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some papers to sign. Behm came to the witness's house
about 8:00, and they sat .there and talked, and he said,
''Where is thos.e papers for me to sign~'' The witness
went to the drawer and got them and put them on the
dining room table and Behm was going to sign them
without reading them. The witness_ said, "You had
better read them, Ed.'' Behm didn't think it was necessary but finally read them over and said, "Oh, they're
all right as far as I know." He signed them and he
\vent away, "and so that's about all there was to that."
( Tr. 204, 205) .
It was stipulated that the testimony of Mrs. Gee
and Miss Julene Gee would be in substance the same as
the testimony of 1\ir. Gee, (Tr. 206, 207). The court
allowed Mr. Behm $500.00 for his s.ervices in this matter
to be paid to his attorneys, (Tr. 209).
Mr. Jones, the· attorney for Mr. Gee, testified that
not long after the death of V enna Darlene Behm Mr.
Gee came to his office and discussed the action against
the doctor; that on April 11, 1947, Mr. Behm came to
his office with the Gees and signed the petition for
ap·pointment of administrator and appointment of guardian; (Tr. 179, 180). The witness told Behm that he and
the two minor daughters were the heirs of Venna Darlene Behm and the only one who could recover under
the law and asked him why he didn't go ahead as administrator and guardian, being the husband and father,
and Behm said, ''I don't want anything to do with it.''
Mr. Jones told Behm, "If you sign these documents,
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you authorize l\lr. Gee to take charge of the estate and
to take charge of the property of the minors, and you
are out," and he said, ''Yes, I understand that." ( Tr.
182, 183). ~\_t that time it was stated by son1e one to
Mr. Behm either by the witness or Mr. Gee that Mr.
Gee \Yas not \Yilling to undertake all the responsibility
unless there was some assignment to him in the case,
and as a result of that conversation in the witness's
office Exhibit 6, the "Assignment", was drawn. After
the conversation was over, it was given to Mr. Gee to
have Mr. Behm sign it. The_ witness took Mr. Behm into Mr. Gordon Strong who was in his office and told
Mr. Strong to notarjze the documents in the guardianship and administration matter, introduced Mr. Behm,
and told Mr. Strong, "This is the father of the babies
in the Holbrook case-and the husband, and _he is sig~ing
away his rights to his father-in-law, and I want you to
notarize it." (Tr. 183). The witness never heard from
or saw Behm until some time in· November or December
after he had agreed on a settlement with the attorneys
for the doctor. Then Behm came in with some statement about some evidence that he had where he could
get $100,000.00 from the doctor, and Mr. Jones told him,
''This matter is going along· all right.'' · Behm said he
was going to see the attorneys for the doctor, and the
witness told him to stay away from the attorneys for
the doctor, "you have nothing to do with this matter.-"
B,ehm left, and the witness never saw him again until
he came into the witness's office with Mr. Langlois
afterSponsored
theby thesettlement
was made. After court approval
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of the settlement, some days elapsed in order for the
bank to send the draft for collection, and it was about
the 28th of January, 1948, when the draft was cleare4
and payment made to Mr. Gee, (Tr. 183, 184). The
first time the witness ever heard that ther~ was any
controversy between Behm and Gee was in February or
March of 1948 after the settle·ment was made. No que~
tion was ever raised about the ''Assignment'' by Mr.
Behm or any one else until after the settlement was
made. The witness had only seen Behm three times,
8.f5 above related, (Tr. 184). Behm was perfe~tly disinterested in what was being d9ne.
"MR. McCARTY: Now, Mr. J one~, you treated
this -as an estate, didn't you~ You gave notice to creditors, didn't you~
A.

To tell you the truth, Mr. McCarty, I never
paid any attention to it. There was no controversy. The only thing I wanted was to
have administrator appointed and bring a
lawsuit. Everybody that was in the thing was
agreed on it." (Tr. 186) .

..¢\.fter the settlement and before any distribution could
be :p~ade to the guardian or any new bond secured for him,
l3ehm came in with his objections.
At the time of the petition for guardian and administrator Behm was completely disinterested in the
whole thing, and at that time it didn't app·ear that there
would be any recovery, ( 'fr. 190). The witness thought
tha,t if there was any recovery and Mr. Gee did all the
work and carried all the responsibility he should be
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protected. ..:-\.s to \Yhether there \vould be any recovery
or not who could tell. The \VitnesB told Behm he was
entitled to one-third of whatever \Vas recovered. The
""i.tness interpreted the death statute and always has
that the heirs share in the proportion that they are
heirs, (Tr. 191, 192). The vvitness told Behn1 that he
\\~as the one to carry on the proceedings, and Exhibit.
6, the "..._-\..ssignment", wasn't prepared until after conference on the 11th of April in witness's ·office. The
witness was not concerned about .the distribution of the
money, thought the heirs were entitled to it, and that
an action should be brought against the doctor. The
witness assumed that the statute not the witness took
care of the distribution. If it hadn't been for Mr. Gee,
there wouldn't have been anything in this case. He
was deeply interested in the welfare of the babies and
they never would have gotten a cent if it hadn't been
for him, and they would have had their money long
ago if it hadn't been for their father, the protestant
here, (Tr. 192, 195). Mr. Gee is a highly proper person
to have charge of this matter, ''He was the only one
manifesting any interest in the babies at all.'' In all
these proceedings Mr. and Mrs. Gee spent hours and
days in assisting in the preparation of the proceedings.
It took several months to prepare the case against the
doctor, and it was essential that every detail be worked
out thoroughly.

Mr. and Mrs. Gee were the ones who

detern1ined whether or not the settlement would be accepted, and they did so after thoroughly considering
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lawsuit and no recovery at all except for them, (Tr.
195, 197). No one ever had any idea that there would
be any controversy with Behm about this matter. The
G-ees were the only ones who rendered the witness any
assistance whatever to ascertain the .facts necessary to
bring the -action against the ·doctor. Behm was never
notified of the settlement as he had already indicated
that he had no interest in it and was out of it, (Tr. 199).
The protestant offered no evidence in rebuttal of
the testimony of Mr. Gee and Mr. Jones, and there were
no denials by protestant of the specific statements as
to the actual transactions involved herein.
~S;TATEMENT

OF ERRORS

1. The court erred in making the following Findings of Fact for the reason that they are contrary to
and against the evidence : Finding of Fact No. 4 that
Alma Gee had the protestant sign the "Assignment",
Exhibit 6; th-at there was no consideration for said
''Assignment'' ; that Edward C. Behm did not fully
comprehend the import or the contents of said'' Assignment''; that he had not been fully and completely instructed as to his rights in said matter; also Findings
9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16.

2. That .the court erred In making Findings of
Fact Nos. 8, 9, 12, 13, 15 and 16 for the further reason
that each of them is surplusage, and redundant, and
irrelevant, and not within the issues.
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3. That the court erred in n1aking the following
Conclusions of La"r for the reason that the same are
not supported by the evidence and are against and contrary to the la'v: Conclusion of L.aw No. 1 that the
right of action for the death of V enna Darlene Behm,
deceased, was at no time subject to probate; Conclusion of Law No.2 that Exhibit 6, the "Assignment" of
Edward C. Behm to Alma Gee, is void and of no effect;
Conclusion of Law No. 3 that there was no consideration
for the "Assignment", Exhibit 6, and that the said
"Assignment" was "champerty" and, therefore, void;
Conclusion of Law No. 4 that because the protestant
does not require or need any of the recovery and because of the condition of arrested development and the
needs of the minor children, the said Edward C. Behm,
protestant therein, is not entitled to any part of the
recovery; ConclusioD: of Law No. 5 that Alma Gee, appellant herein, is not entitled to anything by reason of
the said "Assignment", Exhibit 6, and that the said
Alma Gee is only entitled to the sum of $750.00 for all
his services in this case, the guardianship case and the
case against the doctor, and that $750.00 is payment in
full to him for all his services and costs herein and in
said matters; C.onclusion of Law No. 7 that the attorneys for Edward C. Behm are entitled to an order
directing ·the Clerk of the Court to turn over to them
$500.00 for their services in this matter; Conclusion of

Law No. 8 that the balance· of the recovery, $10,000.00,
should be distributed to the guardian of the minors in
the amount of $5,000.00 to each minor.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26
4. That the court erred in entering judgement allowing the administrator, Alma Gee, only the sum of
$750.00.

That the· court erred in entering judgement in
favor of C. Vern on Langlois and Ray S. McCarty for
5.

$500.00.

6. That the court erred in entering judgement that
the $10,000.00 be divided equally between the two

minors.
That the court erred in holding the ''Assignment" Exhibit '6. void.
7.

'

That the court erred in refusing to distribute
.the money herein equally between Alma Gee and the
·two minors after the payment of attorneys' fees and
other legitimate expenses.
8.

That the court ·erred in refusing to recognize
and give effect to the ''Assignment'', Exhihit 6.
9.

ARGUMENT

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS
The Findings of Fact in this matter are rather
weird. Instead of presenting a dispassionate consideration of the testimony such as should characterize judicial action, they manifestly reflect an attitude of bias
and vengeance wholly outside of the issues and not
sup·ported in any respect by the evidence. The trial
court was obviously controlled by a situation that arose
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in court, long after the relevant act8 in this n1atter had
occurred. This situation had nothing 'vhatever to do
with the solution of the legal problems involved in this
matter~ no relevancy at all in the proper solution of the
problems before the court for solution. The incident
've have related of the adn1inistrator 'vithdrawing the
money from the bank and then being required to produce it in court and deposit it '\vith the Clerk of the
Court has no possible bearing on the issues in this
matter. It was a matter wholly unconnected with the
completed transactions between Behm and Gee and the
case against the doctor, and yet that incident alone·
could account for the hodge-podge of irrelevant denunciations appearing throughout the Findings of Fact.
Actually there is no finding or attempt to make a
finding or conclusion of fraud, one of the main issues.
In addition, the findings that the administrator, appellant here, was not a credible witness, was wilfully derelict in his duty; that he cannot be trusted with the
money; that the testimony given by him and his witnesses is not to be relied up·on, have no bearing upon
the issues here. Also the trial court finds that the
husband, Behm, was grief-stricken and upset, although
what relevency this has to the case doesn't appear;
that he had full confidence and trust in Gee, and why
not-Gee did a good job, he did not deceive or attempt
to deceive Behm; that Behm had not been fully instructed in his rights, with no finding that anyone had
any duty to instruct him; that Gee did not say anything concerning the contents of the ''Assignment'' nor
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attempt to explain the contents, when the record is undisputed that Gee insisted on Behm reading the ''Assignment", made no representations whatever about it,
and Behm did read the ''Assignment'', and the ''Assignment'' is here in evidence and demonstrates that
any school boy upon reading it would understand it;
that Gee posted two nominal bonds, when it appears
without contradiction that he posted the only bonds
ever required of him~ that Gee did not keep B·ehm informed of the action against Holbrook, when Gee was
under no duty to do so; that $500.00 should be paid to
Behm's attorneys, when they completely failed to secure anything sought by them in their petitions-$1,600.00 for Behm in expense 1noney and to split the
balance of the recovery between Behm and the children.
This Behm sought both in his petition for an order to
show cause, (Tr. 18), and in his objections to the petition for distribution, (Tr. 38, 41). The trial court
further finds that Ge·e did not perform all of his duties
in the face of the undisputed fact that without Gee's
efforts there would not have been one cent recovered
in this cas·e, and that there is now on deposit with the
Clerk of this Court $10,500.00 for distribution to those
entitled to it, including the babies, which would not
have been available except for Gee. The only purpose
of the whole controversy was to recover for the death
of Venna Darlene Behm, and that recovery has been
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accomplished through the efforts of Aln1a Gee and his
attorney and no one else. Not one din1e did this protestant ever secure or atteinpt to secure for the benefit
of his children on account of the death of his \vife.
The trial court found that the ''Assignment'' was
''champertous''. There was no issue of champerty
and no issue of no consideration for the assignment
presented by the protestant's objections in this case.
They \vere the ·contributions of the trial court in an
effort to punish Gee, not for any dereliction of duty
in collecting for the benefit Df the heirs, but solely because of the episode above related in bringing the money
into court. Champerty was neither proved nor pleaded,
and as we shall point out, it must be pleaded in order
to be a defense.
The legal propositions involved in this case fall
roughly under two headings, the first of which in turn
is divisible into 4 sub-headings :
I. The Validity of the "Assignment", Exhibit 6.
(A) Assignability of Behm's Share of any Recovery.
(B) There was no fraud on the part of Gee in
Connection with the ''Assignment''.
(C) Consideration for the ''Assignment''.
(D) Is the "Assignment''

Champertous~

II. Distribution and Proportions of Distribution of
the Recovery.
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1. THE VALIDITY OF THE ''ASSIGNMENT'', EXHIBIT 6.
(A) Assignability of

B~ehm's

Share

·of any Recovery.

The entire argument of counsel below was based
upon the three decisions in Johanson vs. CucJ.ahy Packing Compa;n;y, 100 Utah 399, 115 Pac. (2) 794, 101 Utah
219, 120 Pac. (2) 281, and 107 Utah 114, 152 Pac. (2)
98. These decisions were relied upon by opposing counsel upon the basis that this court is committed to the
doctrine that a cause of action for death is non-assignable. These decisions have no bearing whatever upon
the p-roblem with which we are concerned here. There
was no assignment of any cause of action for death in
this case. There was no attempt to assign the cause
of action for the death of Venna Darlene Behm, deceased.
Our statute, Sectio~ 104-3-11, U.C.A. 1943 so far
as pertinent provides a.s follows:

'' * * * when the death of a person not a
minor is caused by the wrongful act or neglect
of another, his heirs, or his personal representatives for the benefit of his heirs, may maintain an action for damages against the p·erson
causing the death, * * *. In every action under
this and the next preceding section such damages may be given as under all the circumstances
of the case may be just.''
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The cause of action \vas not assigned. The cause of
action "~as brought by . .>\.lma Gee, administrator of the
estate of \""enna Darlene Behm, for the benefit of "Venna Julene Behm and Cheryl Darlene Behm, who together with deceased's husband, Edward Behm, constitute the heirs of said deceased.'' The complaint
also alleges ''that as a result of the negligence and
carelessness as aforesaid the said heirs of said ''deceased'' were damaged. Edward c. Behm did not assign his cause of action. He petitioned the court to
appoint Alma Gee as his representative, and upon his
petition Alma Gee was ap,pointed the personal representative for all the heirs and brought the cause of
action as the personal rep=resentative. The cause of
action was brought exactly as the statute says it should
be, by the personal representative for the benefit of
the heirs. The ''Assignment'' assigned all of Behm 's
''right, title, claim and interest in and to the said estate·,
the proceeds thereof, and particu~arly the proceeds of
any ~reoovery made ior reoovered from V~on G. H~olbrotok
or any recovery made or recov,ered for the death of
said deceased." We have found no case holding that
an heir may not make an assignment of his share as
an heir. The argument is made that this claim is not
an asset of an estate, and in the striet sense of the
term that is true. However, all the authorities including this court hold that it is a sufficient asset of the
estate for the appointment in probate of an adminisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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trator. Mr. Justice McCarty, In-re Lowh).am's Estat.e,
30 Utah 43.6, 441, 85 Pac. 445, says
''While a claim for ·damages for death by wrongful act is not a general asset of the estate under
the foregoing provisions of the Wyoming -statutes, we think it is a s.ufficient asset of the estate for the purpose of appointing an administrator. This court, in effect, so held in the case
of In-re Estate of Tasanen, 25 Utah 396, 71 Pac.
984. The doctrine declared in that case is not
only in harmony with a great weight of authority, but is, we think, supported by the better
reason.'' ·
The Wyoming statute is of similar import to our own.
In fact this court in line with all the authorities has
held that while an heir may not bind the estate, he may
nevertheless bind any interest he may have, and that
while he may not compromise a claim against the estate, he may bind himself or any interest he has in the
estate, D11A1in vs. Wallingford, 47 Utah 491, 500, 155
Pac. 347. And In-re Z·uniga vs. Evans, 87 Utah 198,
48 Pac. (2) 513, this court held in line with all the
authorities that a pe-rson with a cause of action for
tort has sufficient interest to constitute him a creditor
of the tort feasor so that he may follow the p~roperty
of the tort feasor into the hands of a grantee in the
event he recovers judgement against the tort feasor.
In other words, by virtue of the fradulent conveyance
statute, 33-1-1, Behm was a creditor of the doctor who
caused his wife's death, a creditor being a person having a claim whether matured or unmatured, liquidated
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or unliquidated, and as such creditor he had a property
right even though his claim was unliquidated. In Zuniga
vs. Evans the defendant ~s conveyance of his property
made prior to judgment against him in a tort action
\vas set aside in favor of the plaintiff in the tort action .
. A.s a matter of practice heirs are constantly assigning
interests in their recovery under the death statute .
.A. ttorneys, as was the case in this action, take the case
on a contingent fee basis, that is the heirs assign a
proportion of their interest in the recovery to the attorney as a consideration for bringing the action. This
was early sustained in this court as proper. In-re
Evans, 42 Utah 282, 130 Pac. 217. That was a death
case wherein the heirs retained the attorneys on a contingent fee of 50% of whatever amount might he recovered in the action. This court held that this was
entirely legal and proper, citing former Utah cases
''where it was held by this court that contracts for
contingent fees, based on a moiety of the amount of
recovery, are lawful.''
The cause of action here was not assigned but was
brought for the benefit of the heirs by the personal
representative. One of the heirs assigned his interest
in the recovery. He did not assign his cause of action
but authorized the cause of action to be brought by the
personal representative for the benefit of all the heirs.
The heir was a creditor of the doctor, and he assigned
the amount of his debt to Mr. Gee, and the cause 'of
action was maintained as the statute requires. In any
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event Behm should not be allowed to question the ''Assignment'' after Gee has fully performed.
(B) Ther-e ·was no Fram,d on the part of Gee in
c·oVJ'IIrt.ectiorn with the ''Assignment''.

There is not one word in the record that would
support a finding that Gee procured the "Assignment"
fraudulently. There is no Finding of Fact or Conclusion
of Law that the ''Assignment'' was procured by fraud,
and yet fraud and the non-assignability of the cause
of action were the only issues actually raised by the
protestant. Gee was appointed administrator on Behm's
petition because Behm according to his own statement
didn't care to act and because Behm according to the
overwhelming weight of the evidence refused to act because he thought it was useless and there could be no
recovery against the doctor. Before Gee was appointed
administrator, Behm assigned his right in any recovery
to Gee upon consideration that Gee would carry forward the proceedings, and particularly for the benefit
of Behm's minor children. Before Gee was appointed
administrator, Behm had ceased to have any right to
any recovery for himself. His only concern thereafter
was that Gee should proceed diligently with the action
against the doctor in order that Behm's minor children
could receive their proper share of anything recovered
on account of the death of their mother. Behm protests that he didn't know what the "Assignment" was.
He admits, howev·er, that he read it. It also appears
that he did know he had a shar'e in any recovery.
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He said ( Tr. 112) ''I ""as assigning my share over I
figured • • ,. . '' The ~ •Assignment'' consists of only
16 lines and in addition to stating clearly that Behm
assigns all of his interest in any recovery to be made
for the death of his wife, it expressly provides that
said nrinor children shall receive their full share free
and clear of this assignment. Words could not more
clearly indicate not only that Behm was assigning his
share of the recovery but that there was a share aside,
additional and apart from his that belonged to the children, and that the assignment of his share should in
no way affect their share. As a matter of fact, Behm
does not deny Mr. Gee's testimony, (Tr. 205), that Behm
wasn't even going to read the "As-signment" until Mr.
Gee insisted that he should. There is not one word in
the record that Mr. Gee misrep-resente-d the contents of
the- ''Assignment'' to Behm. As a matter of fact, Behm
was clearly advised at the conference in Mr. Jones'
office on April11, 1947, that he was taking himself completely out of the picture, a!ld at that time he- stated
that he didn't want anything to do with the case, and
that he understood that he was out of it. Also at that
conversation Behm was told that Mr. Gee \Vas not willing to proceed without the assignment to him, (Tr. 183).
Behm understood thoroughly that Mr. Gee was not
willing to assume all the burden and then have Behm
reap the fruits of his., Gee's, efforts when Behm himself wouldn't do anything at all in the matter. At the
time the '' . A.ssignment'' was made Behm was convinced
that the whole matter was a fruitless undertaking; that
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there would he no recovery, and he was not willing to
undertake any part of it. It needs no citation of authority that fraud must be proved by evidence that is clear
and convincing, and that mere suspicion is not e~ough.
Not only is there no clear and- convincing evidence, but
there is no evidence whatever of fraud on the part of
Mr. Gee. Behm executed the "Assignment" without
any urging or misrepresentations whatever on the part
of Gee. We submit none of the things that the Court
round preceding the ''Assignment'' are sufficient to
even infer fraud. The court found that Behm read the
''Assignment", signed the "Assignment" in order that
the action against the doctor might be commenced.
That's true, because Gee wasn't willing. to go ahead
and then have Behm reap 'the fruits of his labors. There
is no finding of fraud, and there certainly is no evidence
of fraud. As a matter of fact, counsel for Behm rather
over-reached themselves in preparing the Findings of
Fact. In finding No. 2 they proposed this sentence ·as
to 'vhat preceded the execution of the "Assignment":
''That said Alma Gee, the administrator herein, eyen
proposed to the protestant that they go into a partnership for the purpose of commencing suit against the
doctor." The court struck out the word "even", but
it found that Gee proposed the alleged p-artnership. The
only place that this evidence ap,pears in the record is
from the testimony of Mr. G·ee himself, (Tr. 203). The
court, however, exp·ressly finds that. Mr. Gee ''was not
a credible witness", (Tr. 59, finding No. 9) ; "that the
evidence given by Mr. Gee is not to be relied upon",
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(Tr. 61). It was credible, however, and was to be relied upon 'vhen the court came to make a finding against
~Ir. Gee, and in the conversation concerning the partnership )fr. Gee was urging Behm to take action and
Behm insisted that there was no use suing a doctor,
''they have got a fence around them with the law, and
you can't get in.''* * • (Gee) ''so I wanted him to go
in on it. I said, 'let's go in partners, Ed,' and he said,
"No, I don.'t want anything to do with that at all'."
(Tr. 203). It is impossible to conceive how Mr. Gee
could propose a partnership with Mr. B-ehm in something that Behm had no interest in so when the court
found that l\Ir. Gee proposed a p~artnership with Behm
before the "Assignment" was made, the court by that
finding inadvertently also found not only that Gee
was insisting to Behm that he did have some rights
and that he share those rights with Gee, but also that
Behm if he didn't know about them before, learned
about them at that conversation and still refused to
proceed. By that finding the court as a necessary result thereof found that instead of misrepresenting to
Behm, Gee told Behm of his rights and .wanted to share
them, and Behm knew all about them and refus·ed-not
to share them, but to exercise them -at all, and that he
later assigned all those rights to Gee.
If authorities were necessary to demonstrate that
there is no basis to even consider the question of fraud,
we refer this court to its language in Kelly vs. S~alt Lake
Transportati;on C~ompany, 100 Utah 436, 116 Pac. (2)
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383, wherein at page 441 of the Utah Reports this court
quotes the Pennsylvania court with approval as follows:
"It has been more than once held that it is error
to submit a question of fraud to the jury upon
slight parole evidence to overturn a written instrument. The evidence ·of fraud must be clear,
precise and indubitable; otherwise it should be
withdrawn from the jury.''
(C)

0-onsideraxtion for the '' As~ignm.ent''

The court found that there was no consideration for
the ''Assignment.'' This we do not desire to discuss
at length. There was no issue of lack of consideration.
If counsel have any cases to support such a finding in
the face of this record, we will be deeply interested to
read them and will then respond to them. The ''Assignment" recites and the r·ecord shows that ·Gee .had instituted proceedings for the recovery for the death of the deceased. The record shows that these p~roceedings we-re
instituted at the instance and petition of Behm. The
''Assignment'' then provides that Gee will continue to
carry on the procee-dings for recovery, and particularly
for the benefit of Behm's minor children, and in consideration for so doing, Behm assigns his share of the
proceeds of the recovery. Gee performed and carried
on _proceedings and recovered for the benefit of the minor
children, and they now have available several thousand
dollars each as a result. Behm made a contract that he
would give Gee something if Gee would do something
in return for Behm's children. Gee has done that, and if
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there are any cases that say that that is not a valid
consideration for the '• . A.ssign1nent, '' \Ve confess we are
not fruuiliar "ith them.
(D)

Is the •• .Assignment'' Champertous?

The court found that the ''Assignment'' was. champertous. This, as we have already indicated, was the
court's own idea. Counsel had already called Mr. Gee
everything they could think of and charged him with
every applicable crime so the court added his contribution overlooked by counsel, to the picture and found
champerty. It is elementary that champerty is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded and p~roved by the
person interposing it, 10 Am. Jur., Sec. 36, page 577.
The protestant did not plead champerty, and there is no
evidence of champerty. This court speaking through
Judge. McCarty, the father of one of protestant's counsel,
in the case of In-re Evans, supra, 42 Utah 282, had the
following to say at page 335 :
"But few rules of the common law have
undergone more sweeping changes in their application than those relating to maintenance and
champerty.''
And on page 337 quoting from 1 Page on Contracts who
in turn quotes from Blackstone, Judge McCarty approves
the following language:
'' 'A man may, however, maintain the suit
of his near kinsman, servant, or poor neighbor
out of charity and compassion, with impunity,'
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and adds: 'A parent may supply his daughter
with funds to sue, as for breach ·of promise and
seduction. So it is not maintenance for a wife
to aid her husband'."
This is in line with the great weight of authority as
pointed out by Judge McCarty. As a matter of fact, it
is extremely. doubtful if it would lie in the mouth of
Behm to raise the defense of champ·erty. There is a decided conflict in the decisions and many courts hold that
one· cannot plead champerty as a defense to an assignment, ~hen he. has received all the benefits contemplated
under- the assignment, 10 Am. Jur., ~sec. 29', page 572. Not
only is champerty a gratuitous issue injected into the
case by the court and not the parties, but there is no
evidence whatever in this case of champerty. Mr. Gee,
as he had a perfect right to do, was proceeding for re.

·'

'

covery of the death of his daughter for the benefit of her
'

-

heirs including his own grandchildren. As stated by the
North Carolina Supreme Court forty years ago in Smith

vs. Hartsel, 63 S.E. 172:
- "There is much reason, it thus s-eems., for the
relaxation of the old doctrines pertaining to the
subject, so th~t they may be adapted to the new
order of things in the present-highly progressive and commercial age. Necessity and justice
have, accordingly, forced the establishing of recognized exceptions to the doctrine of these offenses. Among these may be enumerated the
following instances: Relation by blood and marriage will often justify parties m giVIng each
other assistance in lawsuits ; ''
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~either counsel nor the court thought of accusing Mr.

Gee of being a Communist or a foreign agent or a Socialist, or likely "Te would be discussing those matters
too. It 'vould have been just as relevent to make suc.h
findings as it 'Ya.s to make the findings that the court
did make. This case is an illustration of the depressing
results of injecting spleen and bias into judicial pronouncements.

II. DISTRIBUTION AND PROPORTIO·NS OF DISTRIBUTION OF THE RECO·VERY.
Regardless of what recognized rule is followed in
the distribution of the recovery, there are no cases supporting the method used by the trial court. Neither reason nor authority supports the judgment of the lower
court.
There is no uniform rule governing the distribution
of the proceeds received as recovery for wrongful death.
The matter is entirely controlled by the statutes of the
various states. Many of them are patterned under Lord
Campbell's Act and none of them that we have found is
identical with our own death statute, 104-3-11. This court
so far as we have been able to determine has not passed
directly upon the question of distribution, although there
dre several cases in this court using language which
would indicate that the statute of distribution in probate
controls. This would seem not only reasonable but required by the wording of our statute. The statute provides that if the personal representative brings the acSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tion, it is brought for the benefit of the heirs, or the heirs
may bring the action for their own benefit. There is no
exclusion of any heir. There is nothing in the statute to
authorize the court to favor one heir over another.
As Judge McCarty pointed out in the early case,
ln-re Lowham's Estate, 30 Utah 436, supra, the claim for
damages is a sufficient asset of the estate for the purpose
of appointing an administrator. Some of the cases point
out that while the amount of damages recoverable in
a death action is controlled by the loss sustained by those
to whom the statute gives the right of action, that does
not control the proportions of distribution. All of
the cases hold that distribution must be made only to
those designated by the particular statute. Our statute
says the action may be maintained for the benefit of the
heirs, and there. is no dis tinction between them. The damages to be recovered are the total damages sustained by
reason of the death. In this state the heirs of one who
dies intestate and leaves a husband or wife and more
than one child living, share one-third to the surviving
husband or wife and the remainder in equal shares to
the children, 101-4-5 (1).
The argument is made In some of the cases that
r>#l<

distribution should he made to the heir in proportion to
the loss he sustained upon the alleged theory that it
would be unfair to allow recovery for the loss sustained
and then distribute the sum in accordance with the
statute of distribution, the theory being that some heirs
would r~eceive damages awarded for the loss sustained
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by other heirs. The result of such reasoning has been

the utmost confusion in the cases. Some statutes allow
the jury to fix the proportionate amounts of recovery,
others allow the court to do so, ,y·hile others adhere either
by statute or in the absence of statute to the doctrine of
distribution in accordance with the statue of distribution.

In our state the Legislature has already said that
the heirs of a p·erson who dies intestate and leaves a
surviving spouse and more than one child share onethird to the surviving spouse and the remainder in equal
shares to the children. Our death statute, 104-3-11, has
been amended since the original law was enacted in
1888, but it has not been amended since 1901. The words,
''for the benefit of his heirs'', in the phrase referring
to the bringing of the action by the personal representative were added in 1901. Our succession and distribution
statute is identical with the statute of 1888 except for the.
last sentence of sub-division 1 with which W·e are not
here concerned, which was added as a p~roviso in 1899,
(See notes following each section in the Code). Always
the succession statute has provided that the heirs of
one who dies intestate share in the proportions above
indicated. The argument of unfairness would apply with
the same force to this statute as to distribution of death
proceeds under the distribution statutes, but for sixty
years and more that has been the method of distribution
in this state, and under it has become ·established an
orderly and recognized method of distribution. Had the
Legislature desired any different method of distribution
it undoubtedly
would have so sp·ecified when the death
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statute was amended in 1901 to provide that the personal
representative might bring the action for the benefit of
the heirs, the heirs of a person dying intestate being those
designated by the succession statute.
As above indicated the authorities of other jurisdictions are of little assistance except as. they announce
collateral principles helpful in the solution of our problem. The statement in 16 Am. Jur., Sec. 2'51, page 172,
is as acceptable and definite as it is possible to make
under the authorities. That authority points out that
under Lord Campbell's Act the jury fixed the ·Share of
the various beneficiaries and that similar provisions are
found in some of the death statutes in the United States;
that other statutes di~tribute to certain designated persons in designated proportions, others that the personal
representative shall distribute the damages as they are
adjusted between themselves by the. persons taking,
'

I

oth~rs

that the court makes the apportionment in accordance with the age and conditions of the beneficiaries, and
continuing says:
.

'

.

"In many, however, if not most, of the statutes,
although the amount of damages assessed for
the unlawful killing is required to be based upon,
and limited to,. the pecuniary loss of certain
designated p~ersons, it is exp·ressly provided that
the damages recovered in such an action shall
be distributed to the statutory beneficiaries in
the proportions provided by law in relation to
the distribution of personal p:rop·erty left by
person dying intestate." (Sec. 251, supra, citing
cases from some 18 states and the District of
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Colmnbia). • ., 'The statute of distribution applicable to decedents' estates is also frequently
used as a guide in maJ\:ing the distribution of
the damages recovered where there is no mandatory statutory provision in regard to the apportionment.''
One jurisdiction only, to-'vi t: California, in the case of
ln-re Riccomi, 197 Pac. 97, is cited as authority that distribution when not fixed by statute shall be on the basis
of the pecuniary loss sustained by the distributees.
None of the cases support the method used by the
trial court in this case in the judgment making distribution.
We shall call the court's attention to the Utah cases
after making reference to a few of the decisions from
other jurisdictions. The decisions from other jurisdictions in some instances consider the Federal Employers'
Liability Act under which the jury may but is not required to proportion the damages as is required under
Lord Campbell's Act. See Central Vermont R. Co. vs.
White, (1904), 238 U. S. 507, 59 L. Ed. 1433, 35 S. C. R.
865. Our death statute is not the same as either of those
acts.
Three of the New York cases have some points of
interest. Re Aronowitz, 272 N. Y. S. 421, (Surrogate)
(1934), is a case where the wife was killed, as in the case
at bar, and she was survived by her husband eighty years
old and two children by a former marriage. During the
pendency of the action the husband died. The settlement
for the wife's death was $4,000.00. It was claimed that
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the amount should be divided three ways, one share
to the husband and one each to the two children. The
wife's children wanted it all. The court held in line
with all the authorities that the amount must be distributed in accordance with the law which created the
action. Those persons who are entitled to the money
have a vested prop~erty right from the moment the statutory cause of action accrues. This is in line with the
proposition we heretofore advanced under I (A) that
Behm had a prop,erty right which he could assign. The
New York court says that the cause of action is not
terminated by the death of the statutory distributee but
becomes an asset of his estate, so the husband's heirs are
entitled to his share. The amount to be recovered for
the death of the wif.e is the total pecuniary loss suffered
by the entire class, but is distributable not in proportion
to the respe·ctive losses ·but in accordance with a fixed
formulae of the statute of distribution. The New York
statut.e provided that the amount recovered should be
distributed in accordance ·with the statute of distribution, ·so one-third went to each of the husband and the
two children. Re Klein, 295 N. Y. S. 197, (Surr.) (1937),
is a case where the survivors were a wife and two minor
children, and the New York court again said that their
rights were controlled entirely by statute. The statute
involved in that case was a federal statute that provided
that the distribution is in p·roportibn to the loss suffered.
The court figured from the mortality tables, the expectancy of the wife and her deceased husband, the
length of time until the son and the daughter arrived
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at their majority or a period of earning capacity and
1nade distribution upon that basis. And In"""re Nelson,
5 N. Y. S. (2) 398, (Surr.) (1938), the court announced
another well known rule that there is an absolute presumption that the "ife and children suffer pecuniary loss.
In that case the court distributed the recovery in accordance with the mortality tables for the wife and the
length of minority left for each of the children.
On the contrary Arkansas in Farulkner vs. Farulkwe!r,
57 S. W. (2) 818, (1933), says age and ·exp·ectancy is not
the test of loss. And the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in G.aydos vs. D~omabyl, 152 A. 549, says that Pennsylvania law requires distribution in accordance with pecuniary loss and then defines pecuniary loss as synonymous with pecuniary advantage including s-ervices to be
expected but not including physical pain, medical or
other expenses. 'Such expenses could only be recovered
by virtue of another sp·ecial statute. The loss to the
husband, say the Pennsylvania court, by the death of
his wife are her services as a wife, less maintenance,
etc. Loss of a mother to the children is tender solicitude,
the teaching of frugality, industry, usefulness, and the
loss to all of them is in the managem·ent of the household, buying food and clothing, washing, cooking and
general care, and that this loss can ·extend as to the
children beyond minority, this in contradistinction to
the New York cases above cited.
The New Jersey case of Wellbrook vs. Ocean Co. T.r.
C·o., 154 A. 521 (1931), involved the widow and adult
children by a former marriage. The widow claimed that
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the adult children suffered no loss. The court said they,
the adult children, were entitled to their share, citing
the case of Snedeker vs. Snedeker, a leading New York
case, in 58 N .E. 4 (1900).
We cite without extended comment Foster vs.
Hiaks, 46 So. 533 (Miss.) (1908), where all the damages
for death are distributed to wife and children equally;
Throgmorton vs. Allerw~orth, 230 S.W. 967. (Tenn.)
(1921), where the cause ofaction goes to the widow or the
personal representative for the benefit of the widow and
next of kin to be distributed as personal p•roperty, and
in which case the court said the expense of supporting
the children cannot be charged against their share of
the recovery, as was attempted to be done in the case
at bar; Goltr.a vs. Peop~le, 53 Ill. 224 (1870) where the
widow refused to account to the children of her husband
by a former marriage, and it was held that she must
account to them for two-thirds of the amount r·eceived.
She contended that the money was not a part of the estate, and the court said· that it might be true that it
could not be attached by creditors but the administratrix
got it in her representative capacity and must account to
the children; another · ·Pennsylvania case, Allison vs.

Powers, 36 A. 333 (1897), where the husband was killed
and the wife claimed the fund for herself and her children as against the two children of her husband by a
prior marriage who _were self-supporting. The court
said that was immaterial since the statute required distribution under the laws of the intestacy, so while peSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cuniary loss might govern the recovery, it did not govern
the distribution.
In the Indiana case of D·u.z.a,.n vs. 111 eyers, 65 N.E.
1046 (1903) the statute provided that the damages recovered for death shall be for the exclusive benefit of
the widow and children to be distributed in the same
manner as personal property. The widow claimed that
she was entitled to the entire amount of recovery because one son of the decedent, a minor, was living with
other people who were supporting him, and that another
child was 28 years old and had also been living with other
persons. It also appeared that the widow had remarried.
The Indiana appellate court, however, held that the aetion for damages for death was entirely controlled by
statute and that while recovery must be for pecuniary
loss sustained, the law implies a substantial pecuniary
loss in some amount to the wife and the children biJ
the death of the husband, and that even though the children had been emancipated they nevertheless were not
precluded from recovery since pecuniary is not used
only in the sense of money or property but looks to
prospective advantage. The court further said that
cases holding that only beneficiaries who can show a pecuniary loss are entitled to recover are not cases in which
a wife and child are the claimants. A wife and child are
presumed to suffer a pecuniary loss. The Supreme Court
of Oklahoma in the case of Tackett vs. Tackett, 50 Pac.
(2)· 293 (1935 ), held that the law implies a substantial
loss to a minor child regardless of whether the deceased
had supported
it or not. That is also the rule in this
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state. In Oklahoma the jury may make an apportionment, and if the jury does not do so, distribution is made
in accordance with the statute of distribution, and where
the widow recovered a lump sum on behalf of herself
and deceased's minor children, she was estop~ped to say
that their respective detriment was otherwise than is
fixed in the statute of distribution, notwithstanding deceased had not supported his minor child.
The California case, Re Ricc.omi, 197 Pac. 97, heretofore ref-erred to as the only case requiring distribution
in proportion to the pecuniary loss suffered where the
statute is silent, decided by the Supreme Court of California in 1921, considers a case where the wife and a
mother were the only heirs left by the decedent. The
Statute in California provides that the action may be
brought by the heirs or personal representatives and
contains the same provision as contained in the last sentence of our death statute, to-wit: ''In each action under
this and the preceding section such damages may be
given as under all the circumstances of- the case may
be just.'' The California statute does not contain the
amendment of 1901 that now appears in our statute, that
the personal rep~resentative for the benefit of ·the heirs
brings the action. The California court frankly concedes
that it does not intend to be bound by the decisions of
any other state since the California statute has already
been construed. The original statute in California provided that the distribution should be in accordance with
the statute of distribution, and that provision was
omitted in later enactments. Such is not the situation in
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this state. In this state we added the words, "for the
benefit of the heirs'', the words not contained in the California statute. The California court says how perfectly
absurd it "\Yould appear to be to hold that the whole
amount of a recovery giv-en solely on account of the p:ecuniary injury to the surviving wife should then go onehalf to the surviving 'vife and one-half to the mother
who had suffered no pecuniary, injury whatsoever. It
is just as absurd to do what the court did in this case.
Becaus-e the husband is able to support himself and
doesn't need anything from his wife, hold that he suffered no loss and therefore he can get nothing. Carrying
the argument a step further, the children in the case at
bar never suffered any loss because they never knew
their mother and never had her ministrations. The test
applied by the California court is not the test applied
by any other state, and pecuniary loss is not so defined
in any other jurisdiction. How perfectly absurd it would
be for the court to instruct a jury that although concededly the wife had been killed by the negligence of the
defendant, the surviving husband and children are not
entitled to recover anything becaus-e the husband is perfectly able to sup·port himself and his children and financially provide for them all that they need, or to say as
protestant attempted to have the court say in this cas,e
that because one child may need more care and attention
than another, he should get all the money or any sum
in excess of that given the other child of equal age. The
loss to all of them, as pointed out by the Pennsylvania
court,Sponsored
is bythe
same.
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In this state the rule is establish-ed that the damages
must be measured as of the moment of death, S"Mi£lds
vs. Utah Light & Trac·tion Co., 99 Utah 307, 317, 105 Pac.
( 2) 347 ( 1940) . In the concurring portion of his opinion
Mr. Justice Wolfe said that damage for death ''is to be
measured as of the time the cause· of action arose-at the
tim-e of the death due to negligence'', and that events occurring afterwards are immaterial. If it were not· so,
the defendant might benefit and his negligence be excused
because of hen·efi.ts that came about subsequent to but
not consequent on the death it caused. Actually the trial
court made such a conclusion of law (No. ·1, Tr. 61), and
then disregarded it entirely in the judgment. The trial
court held that because it developed after the· death of
their mother that the children· might need unusual care
and ·the ·father didn't need anything, that he should·get
nothing and the children should get it all. The trial
court might ·just as well have found that ·because· the
father had to suppbrt the children who would require
more attention than usual, he should get it all, and they
should get nothing. Neither proposition is the law. Our
statute says the cause of action is for the benefit of the
heirs, and the cases all hold even including California
that where the survivors are husband or wife and children there is a p~resumption of pecuniary. loss. The protestant himself testifi.~d that he was so upset at the time
of the death of his wife and for months thereafter that he
didn't want to bring this action. In fact, he testified that
he was still up~set at the time of the hearing although he
had remarried in the preceding August. Under the trial
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court's theory, the protestant's ren1arriage w·ould cut him
off entirely from any recoYery in spite of the fact that.
he said he 'vas still upset.
The fact of the matter is that the protestant attempted by any means available even if it meant disclaiming his entire interest in the recovery to prevent
Mr. Gee from receiving any portion of this recovery. Of
course this protestant will be perfectly satisfied to have
all the money go to the children, provided he can have
Mr. Gee ou~ted as the guardian of their estates, and particularly if he can get some trust company of his seleCtion to become the guardian. We venture the assertion
that the money will not last five years. The trust company will make no effort to investigate the childrens'
needs, and we venture the assertion that if the officers of
the trust company were interrogated, they would so admit. They simply would not have the facilities for the
small amount of fee available in this case to make the
continuous investigations necessary to meet the onslaughts that would be made on this fund. It is not difficult to envision monthly or other periodic requests for
allowances in increasingly large amounts, because of the
alleged infirmities of these babies. To distribute this
money to a trust company as guardian of the babies is
the equivalent of distributing the entire fund to the p·rotestant, and that Mr. Gee resisted and is still resisting
with all the vigor possible even to the extent, upon the
advice of counsel, of withdrawing the money from the
bank and secreting it. According to his statement which
is not
denied, that was his motive in withdrawing the
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money from the bank and his reluctance in disclosing
wher·e it was even upon the urging of the trial court. He
had fought a long and valiant fight to secure a fund on
account of the death of his daughter, and he was determined whether erroneously or not to keep that fund
from coming in any wise under the control of the protestant.
The only thing in this case that can be charged
against Mr. Gee is that he withdrew the money from the
bank and was reluctant to bring it into court for fear
the, protestant would gain control ov·er it. In every respect he faithfully fulfilled his agreement. He fought the
fight for his daughter's death for the benefit of her children. He recovered for them a substantial sum they
otherwise would not have had. He bore the burden and
accounted, we submit, for everything to which the children are entitled.
It is true that this court in Burbidge. vs. Utah Light
& Ttaction Compam;y, 57 Utah 566, states that recovery
under our death statute is founded upon a pecuniary loss,
but it likewise in that case expressly held tha.t pecuniary
loss included loss of society and comp~anionship and that
it was error to instruct the jury so as to deprive an heir
of recovery because there had been no association between him and the deceased for eighteen months before
his death.
In the case of ln-re Evan'tts vs. Q.regon Short Line
Railroad Co., 37 Utah 431, 108 Pac. 638 (1910), this
court held that while it is true that the loss under our
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statute is in a large sense a pecuniary loss, such loss includes the loss of advice, comfort, society enjoyed p-rior
to the death of the deceased and which would have continued, and that even if the deceased did not provid-e
any mo~ey the heirs would still be entitled to recover
''because the society of the deceased may have been a
comfort. and his advice of material assistance to them.''
In that case the court exp-ressly said at page 441 of the
Utah Reports:

'' * * * the jury should be admonished that in no
event can the pecuniary necessities or the physical requirements of the wife or children be considered for the p~urpose of enhancing the damages which were caused by the negligent act
complained of."
In the case at bar the trial court used the lack of pecuniary necessities of the protestant to eliminate him
from distribution, and the p·hysical requirements of the
children to justify giving them the entire recovery. The
trial court did the thing completely backwards.
In the case of In-re Evans, 42 Utah 282, 130 Pac..
217, heretofore cited on another point, the court points
out without comment that after payment of attorn·ey's
fees the probate court paid the balance to the widow
and children. No question was raised about their necessities or their pecuniary loss sustained. The class, to-wit:
the heirs of the deceased were given the amount of the
recovery. In P.armley vs. Ple1aso;nt V:alley Co,al Compa;n;ry,
64 Utah 125, 228 Pac. 557, (1924), this court discusses
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our death statute (pp. 128-9 Utah) and points out that
originally it was taken from the Code of Civil Procedure
of California and is first found in the laws of Utah of
1884, and from there was carried into the Compiled Laws
of Utah in 1888, and from thence into the Revised Statutes of 1898, and that in 1901 it was amended and as
amended the sections are as now appear in the Code.
The amendment of 1901 was to add among other things
the words, ''for the benefit of his heirs.'' The statute as
amended is set forth on page 128 of the Utah Reports.
The court says, page 129 :
''In reading the sections,. by omitting the italicized words one reads them as originally adopted
from the C-alifornia Code, and with the italicized
words as they were amended and as they now
read are in force and effect.''
At the bottom of page 132 and the top of page 133 this
court points out:

"* * * the action must· be for the benefit of. aU
the heirs." (Italics added.)
The court says on page 138 of the Utah Reports:
"If damages are recovered, each heir is entitled
to his p~ropo.rtiovnate share whether he was a
party to the action or not, and, if his share is
withheld from him, he may always sustain an
action against his co-heirs for contribution."
(Italics added.)
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Obviously, if a heir is entitled to his proportionate share,
it must be in the proportion that he is an heir, otherwise
the action would not be for his benefit as an heir. We
submit that when the statute says, ''for the benefit of all
the heirs'', it means for their benefit as heirs, and they
take as heirs and no other way. When the L.egislature
has said that the heirs are entitled to recover, it should
not lie in the mouth of the trial court to say that one
heir shall take and another shall not. In the case of
Bff"ainard's Cottonwood D·airy, et. al. vs. Industrial C.ormmission, et. al., 80 Utah 159, 164, 14 Pac. (2) 212, this
court says:

' ' * * • if damages are recoverable, each heir is
entitled to his pro-rata share 'whether he was
a party to the action or not, and, if his share
is withheld from him, he may always sustain
an action against his co-h-eirs for contribution'.''
(Parmley vs. Pleasant Valley Coal Company,
supra.)
It being clear that the well established rule is that
damages recovered for death must be distributed to the
persons who are designated as the beneficiaries thereof
by the statute, it follows that the trial court was in error
in the case at bar in the proportion and method of distribution. While this court has not squarely passed upon
the question, it has referred to the amount of the distribution as the proportionate share and the pro-rata share
and has app·roved the distribution in probate under the
probate code. While it is of little moment in this case,
we 1nay remark that until this case we never heard in
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this state of a distribution in a death case being made
other than under the provisions of the descent and distribution statute, except Federal Employer's liability
cases.
Under the theory adopted by the court in this case
the jury might in its lump sum verdict have found one
heir to sustain a loss in one amount, and the court might
award that heir a different amount according to the
views of the court which might not be the same as the
views of the jury. The orderly procedure is for the re. .
covery to include the loss sustained under our recognized
rules which have , repeatedly be·en announced by this
court. The distribution then should be made to the heirs,
not one heir, but all the heirs in the proportions that they
take as heirs, and not in some proportion to be guessed
at in each case by either court or jury. There is no more
hardship in such a situation than there is in any other
probate matter where the h·eirs take as heirs in the proportions stated in the statute, regardless of their necessities or physical infirmities. This court, as we have
pointed out, has already said that necessities and physical infirmities have no place and should not be considered
in death cases.
As a matter of fact, the settlement in the case at bar
was made upon the basis of a loss sustained by the protestant. His loss entered into the fixing of the amount
of the settlement, and the trial court disregarded this
entirely in the distribution. We submit that there should
be a fixed and definite rule and that the Legislature by
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saying that the recovery is for the benefit of the heirs
meant that they should take as heirs. Then there is no
uncertainty and there is a fixed method of computation
for every case and every ease is controlled by a definite
and certain rule.
In any event under all the authorities, and even if
the ''Assignment'' could by some stretch of the imagination be called champertous, the administrator is entitled
to a quantum meruit fee for his services. The trial court
did the anomalous thing of holding that the administrator fraudulently appropriated $750.00 and then gave him
the $750.00. Not only was the administrator not fraudulent, but on the contrary was diligent, faithful and successful, and under any theory he is entitled to be r·eimbursed his expenses and a decent amount for creating a
fund which but for his efforts would not have existed at
all. He certainly is entitled to the same compensation as
an attorney because he took the same hazards, did all the
work of assembling the evidence and carried all the responsibility.

ATTORNEYS;' FEES
We wish it to be expressly noted that we are not
asking for any attorneys' fees on this appeal, and we
have purposely not assigned as error the refusal of
the trial court to allow any attorneys' fees to us. We
have never received any fees herein or in the guardianship and never would have asked for any in the petition
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cover from the fund all of his ~xpenses, which he was
not entitled to ge~t from the fund, and a share in addition when he had done nothing whatever to create it.
We have already pointed out that Behm is entitled to
nothing from the fund for his attorneys. He did not
seek· to protect the children. The children were already
protecte~, and they would have received their full share
regardless of anything done by protestant. He failed
in everything he sought. H·e sought only benefits for himself. He has contributed absolutely nothing and has only
caused delay and exp:ense.

CONCLUSION
. We submit that the protestant had a right to assign
his .s~ar~ in the recovery to any one he desired; that he
did so freely and voluntarily and with full knowledge of
what he was doing and for a valid consideration; that
there was no fraud in securing the ''Assignment'', and
that the same is in no respects champertous but is valid
and binding. We submit further that under our death
statute the heirs. take as heirs and in no other way. The
amount of the recoveryis fixed according to their losses
at the time of death, and that the trial court was entirely in error in eliminating the husband as a distributee in order to defeat the valid ''Assignment'' to Mr.
Gee; that the trial court was entirely in error in holding
that the husband gets nothing because he needed nothing,
and that the children get it all because they need it all;
that neither the husband's or childrens' necessities nor
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the childrens' physical condition have anything to do
'vith the amount of the recovery or the distribution of the
same.
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed
and the trial court directed to distribute $11,250.00, onethird to Mr. Gee and one-third each to him as guardian
of the estates of the children, subject to the payment of
proper costs.
Respectfully submitted,

SHIRLEY P. J.ONES
LEWIS LARSON
Att,o"r.neys for Appellant
AdminJistrat~o~r, Alma Gee
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